Several public health interest groups in the United States have recently called for equalization of the federal tax on a unit of alcohol in beer, in wine and in spirits. This paper provides some new empirical evidence of what effect alcohol tax differentials have on total alcohol consumption. The data indicate
I. Introduction
Many countries, including the United States, have adopted taxation and other regulatory policies which favor beer and wine over spirits. The justification for these policies has been the belief that there are differential physiological effects and public health effects associated with each beverage.' Some support for this belief is provided by the biomedical literature. The Brewers Association of Canada (1986) and the Wine Institute of California (1986) review a number of medical studies of the physiological effects of beer, wine, and spirits. These medical studies indicate that the consumption of alcohol in the form of beer or wine results in a slower increase in blood alcohol concentration, a lower maximum blood alcohol concentration, and a faster decrease in blood alcohol concentration, than when the same amount Of alcohol is consumed in the form of spirits.2
In the United States, alcohol tax differentials were increased in 1985. The change was the result of an increase in the federal excise tax on spirits.
The tax increase precipitated a public 1 A second justification for these policies is based on the relative production costs of each beverage. A unit of alcohol is relatively cheaper to produce in the form of spirits than it is in the form of beer or wine. Excise tax differentials thus tend to equate the purchase price of a unit of alcohol in each of the three beverages.
2 The Wine Institute review explains that beer and wine produce lower blood alcohol levels because of the nutrients found in these beverages. These nutrients stimulate a digestive process which breaks down alcohol and thus limits the amount of alcohol which can be absorbed into the blood stream. There is much less evidence of differential physiological effects of beer and wine. service campaign by the distilling industry to promote the concept of equivalence. The equivalence concept states that a 1.25 ounce shot of whiskey, a 12 ounce can of beer, and a five ounce glass of wine all have the same alcohol content. The implication of this campaign was that because each serving has the same alcohol content, each alcoholic beverage has the same potential for adverse public health consequences. This suggests that the alcohol, in each alcoholic beverage, should receive the same tax treatment. This equivalence campaign was also supported by several alcohol oriented public interest groups. One of these interest groups circulated a petition to academic economists in support of an increase in all alcohol taxes and an equalization of the tax on alcohol in each of the three alcoholic beverages. This petition was signed by 80 economists including three Nobel laureates.
The central issue in the debate over equalizing alcohol tax differentials is the degree of beverage substitutability. While beer, wine and spirits all contain alcohol these three beverages are not perfect substitutes. If the three beverages are strongly substitutable, a increase in one tax, or disproportionate increases in all taxes, will induce some consumers to shift to the relatively less expensive beverage. Substitution of beverages will limit the reduction in alcohol consumption which results from the increase in taxes. ldternatively, if the three alcoholic beverages are only weakly substitutable then a change in the tax on one beverage would have only a minor effect on the consumption mix.
While there are a priori reasons to assume substitutability between the three beverages, a review of the empirical literature by Ornstein and Levy (1983) finds little evidence of substitutability. Un (1986) , however, reports evidence that the three alcoholic beverages are substitutable.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a new empirical test of the effect that alcohol tax differentials have on total alcohol consumption. The focus on total alcohol consumption rather than beer, wine and spirits is important for two reasons.
First, alcohol related public health problems are a function of total alcohol consumption rather than specific beverage consumption.
Second, estimation of a total alcohol demand function reduces the number of estimated parameters that must conform to a priori constraints imposed by demand theory.
II. Empirical Framework
Consumer demand theory provides the conceptual framework for the empirical models.
The demand for alcohol is derived by assuming that an individual's utility depends on the consumption of alcohol, the consumption of other goods, and taste. Maximizing this utility function subject to a budget constraint yields the following demand curve for alcohol:
The demand for alcohol (A) is defined as a function of the price of alcohol (P), income (I), and a vector of other factors (Z1).
The price of alcohol can be defined as a function of beer, wine and spirits taxes (tb, t4, ta), other factors (Z2) as follows.
( 2) This price function can be substituted for price in the demand curve. The result in a reduced form demand curve which shows that alcohol consumption is a function of taxes, income and other factors:
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In these three equations fi, 8, and r are coefficients, a are coefficient vectors and the js values are error tens. The reduced form alcohol demand equation can be aggregated across individuals to yield an empirically estimatable equation.
An increase in any one of the beverage taxes results in two effects.
The first effect, called the own-price effect, is a reduction in consumption of that beverage. Demand theory requires a negative own-price effect. The second effect, called a crossprice effect, is a change consumption of another beverage. Demand theory does not provide any a priori conclusions about the direction or magnitude of cross-price effects. If an increase in any one of the taxes results in an increase in consumption of another beverage then the two beverages are substitutes. The ownprice effect causes a reduction in total alcohol consumption.
However, cross-price effects can increase alcohol consumption. The net effect on total alcohol consumption of an increase in any one alcohol tax, or of a change in alcohol tax differentials, is thus ambiguous.
III. Data
The data set used in this study is a time series of cross There are three methods of taxing alcohol. These are: (1) national alcohol taxes, (2) local alcohol taxes, and (3) value added or sales taxes which are not specific to alcohol. Each country included in this study uses national alcohol taxes and several countries also use local and value added or sales taxes.
Only the national tax data is available on a consistent and historical basis across countries. However, national alcohol taxes, which are usually excise taxes, are the largest of the three taxes. National alcohol taxes are also more important than value added and sales taxes because they are alcohol specific.3
The tax data used in the regressions are national taxes per liter of pure alcohol. The national alcohol tax data were divided by the gross domestic product deflator and the purchasing power Local alcohol taxes are generally lower than national taxes and tend to reflect the pattern of national taxes. The tax differentials are thus not seriously affected by local taxes. Value added and sales taxes are a percentage of price and thus tend to tax the alcohol in beer and wine at a higher rate than spirits. This tends to reduce the size of the actual total tax differential on spirits. A fixed effects model is one method of approximating the influence of these omitted factors. Fixed effects models use a series of country dummy variables which, according to Johnston (1984) , can account for differences in country specific unobserved factors.
These fixed effects models also include time dummy variables which account for time trends in the dependent variables. Cook and Tauchen (1982) also use fixed effects models to estimate the effects of taxes and income on liquor consumption and liver cirrhosis mortality rates.
IV.

Results
The results from four fixed effects models are summarized in The dependent variable was transformed into the natural logarithm of alcohol consumption. this functional form is often used in demand studies. Because of aggregation, these regressions are weighted by n12, where n is the population of the country. the dependent variable. Each model uses an alternative combination of the independent variables which provides a test for specification bias.
The three taxes are included in all four models.
The results presented in table 2 show that beer taxes and spirits taxes have a significant negative effect on total alcohol consumption. Wine taxes, however, have no significant effect on total alcohol consumption. The beer tax coefficient indicates that if beer taxes were increased, the increase in alcohol consumption in the form of wine and spirits is insufficient to. offset the decrease in alcohol consumption in the form of beer. The spirits tax coefficient indicates that if spirits taxes were increased, the increase in alcohol consumption in the form of beer and wine is also insufficient to offset the decrease in alcohol consumption in the form of spirits. The wine tax coefficient indicates that if wine taxes were increased, the increase in alcohol consumption in the form of beer and spirits is sufficient to offset the decrease in alcohol consumption in the form of wine.
These results suggest that wine is substitutable with beer and spirits, but beer and spirits are only weakly substitutable with each other. A change in wine taxes would cause substitution to beer and spirits. Symmetry requires that an increase in beer or spirits taxes cause substitution to wine.
These substitution effects are not sufficient to offset the own-price effects. An increase in beer or spirits taxes would not, however result in much substitution between these beverages.
Real income is also included in three specifications. Real income has no a priori expectation since an increase in income can be expected to increase the demand for both alcohol and health.
The increased demand for health could reduce the demand for alcohol. Real income is positive and significant in the alcohol demand equations. These results show that an increase in income increases per capita alcohol consumption.
The remaining independent variables are significant and conform to a priori expectations. The general mortality rate is inversely related to health awareness. The positive coefficient of general mortality suggests that alcohol demand is lower where health awareness is higher. The advertising ban variable is negative and significant suggesting that banning spirits advertisements reduces alcohol demand.
V. Conclusions
This paper provides an empirical test of the effects of alcohol tax differentials on alcohol consumption. Since there is little variation in tax differentials over time in individual countries, data from 14 countries over a period of 14 years were eniployed in the empirical models. All of the regression models estimated are fixed effects models which account for unobservable influences which vary by country and time.
The elasticity of total alcohol consumption with respect to beer taxes is estimated to be .071 and for spirits •taxes is estimated to be .104. Wine taxes have no significant effect on total alcohol consumption. These elasticities were estimated using the empirical model which includes all the independent variables.
The elasticities indicate that the greatest decrease in alcohol consumption results from an increase in spirits taxes. A given percentage increase in beer taxes will reduce alcohol consumption by about 70 percent as much as the same percentage increase in spirits taxes. Wine tax increases have no effect on total alcohol consumption. This suggests that the existing generally accepted taxation policy of placing the highest tax on spirits, a lower tax on beer, and the lowest tax on wine, results in the greatest reduction in total alcohol consumption. .007 (1.42) .007 (1.36) .003 (.67 .98 * The t-ratios are in parentheses. All equations include dummy variables for 13 countries and the years 1970 through 1982, and an intercept.
